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Environmental Trade Barriers Under
NAFTA: The MMT Fuel
Additives Controversy
Julie A. Soloway*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After much public debate and private negotiation, the Canadian federal government agreed in July 1998 to repeal its international and interprovincial trade ban on the fuel additive
Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl (MMT), citing a
lack of scientific justification.1 The Canadian government further agreed to pay U.S.-based Ethyl Corporation $19.3 million
(Canadian) for legal costs and lost profits. 2 Since Ethyl's Canadian business consisted of importing MMT into Canada, blending it with fuel, and then distributing that fuel-MMT blend
nationally, the international and interprovincial trade ban effec3
tively prevented Ethyl from conducting its business.
* S.J.D. Candidate, Faculty of Law and Fellow, Centre for International
Studies, University of Toronto.
The author is grateful for the insightful comments of Professor Michael
Trebilcock and Professor Robert Howse of the Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto; Dr. Sylvia Ostry and Professor Edward Safarian, Centre for
International Studies, University of Toronto; and Professor Jim Chen of the
University of Minnesota Law School. The author is also grateful for the support
of the Social Science Humanities Research Council and the guidance of
Professor Alan Rugman of Templeton College, Oxford University, and
Professor John Kirton, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto.
1. See Sylvia Ostry & Julie Soloway, The MMT Case Ended Too Soon,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 24, 1998, at A15. The legislation being repealed
was the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act, Bill C-29, S.C. 1997, c.11 (in
force June 24, 1997). Id.
2. See id.
3. Although it remained legal to manufacture and sell MMT within each
individual province, the ban in trade is still potentially problematic. First,
there may be a critical mass at which economies of scale in the production of
MMT itself are achieved. This critical mass may be larger than the size of any
individual provincial market, thereby making it uneconomical to set up a production facility for MMT. Second, even if the chemical itself could be easily
produced, the process by which it is blended with gasoline may require additional economies of scale in excess of any individual Canadian provincial market for the product.
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The ban on MMT was the culmination of an ongoing battle
between two major sectors of the Canadian economy: auto manufacturers and petroleum producers. Auto manufacturers supported a ban on MMT, claiming that the additive reduced the
efficacy of the new generation of pollution control equipment developed in response to increasingly stringent emissions standards. Petroleum producers, who blend MMT with gasoline in
their refineries, opposed a ban, arguing that they would be
forced to undertake significant capital expenditures to reconfigure their plants for alternative fuel additives. The controversy extends beyond just MMT: it raises the question of cost
allocation between industries in developing new technologies to
meet the ongoing demand for emissions reduction.
Advocates cited three reasons for the ban:4 first, to protect
the health of Canadians; second, to harmonize North American
fuel standards; and third, to protect workers and consumers
from adverse economic effects due to increased engineering costs
for auto companies. Bill C-29, a ban initiated by Environment
Canada, seems to have been designed both for environmental
and for economic protection. MMT was not banned as a toxic
substance under environmental legislation such as the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. 5 The legislature merely
prohibited its movement across borders.
In response to Bill C-29, Ethyl began an intense litigation6
strategy under the dispute'settlement provisions of NAFTA.
Ethyl launched a successful challenge against the Canadian
government under Chapter 11 of NAFTA's investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Chapter 11 allows an investor from
a NAFTA country to sue the host government of a NAFTA country if that investor's rights have been breached. The Canadian
government settled with Ethyl for $19.3 million (Canadian)
before the panel hearing was completed. 7 Ethyl also attempted
4. See The Honourable Sergio Marchi, P.C., M.P., Minister of the Environment, Statement to the Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Environment
and Natural Resources on Bill C-29: The Manganese Based Fuel Additives Act,
at Parliament Hill, Ottawa (Feb. 20, 1997).
5. See Canadian Environmental Protection Act. 16 R.S.C. (1985) (4th
Supp.) [hereinafter CEPA].
6. This is referred to as "complex institutional responsiveness" on the part
of Ethyl Corp., that is, the willingness to engage NAFTA's dispute settlement
mechanism to overcome trade-restricting environmental regulation. See ALAN
RUGMAN

ET AL.,

ENVIRONMENTAL

REGULATION AND

CORPORATE STRATEGY:

A

NAFTA PERSPECTIVE, ch. 1 (forthcoming 1999). See generally North American
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289.
7. Ostry & Soloway, supra note 1 at A15.
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to instigate a challenge under NAFTA Chapter 20. Chapter 20
allows a government to sue another government for general
breaches of NAFTA.8 The challenge did not proceed because the
U.S. government did not pursue Ethyl's claim. In addition,
Ethyl challenged the constitutionality of Bill C-29 in the Canadian domestic court system. Although a number of preliminary
motions were heard, the legislature repealed Bill C-29 before the
case went to trial. 9 Finally, the Government of Alberta, host to
Canada's oil refining industry, sued the federal government, alleging that Bill C-29 was inconsistent with Canada's new Agreement on Internal Trade (AiT). This challenge was successful,
and the panel established that, under the AiT, Bill C-29 created
an obstacle to trade that did not address a valid environmental
objective. 10
Amidst all the controversy among environmental groups,
trade policy analysts, and other industry players, the issue of
MMT has become a lightning rod for a number of key trade policy issues. First, as a trade-restricting environmental regulation, the ban raises issues about the legality under NAFTA of
environmental regulations that protect the competitive interests
of domestic industry rather than the environment. Second, as
one of the first test cases under NAFTA's innovative investorstate dispute settlement mechanism, the controversy will have
implications for the broader issue of global rules for foreign investor protection, specifically for the ongoing negotiation of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Third, the MMT
dispute raises questions regarding the extent to which the precautionary principle can be used as a basis for enacting traderestricting regulation. Finally, the broader issue of North American environmental regulatory fragmentation, apparent in the
present controversy, poses challenges for the competitiveness of
firms who operate regionally rather than nationally. Auto production requires significant economies of scale since automobiles
are produced for a single regional, North American-wide marketplace. Standards for gasoline must be compatible in a single
regional marketplace as well.
This Article examines the case of MMT and its implications
for some of these key trade policy issues, particularly the capacity of the relevant NAFTA provisions to address protectionist
8. Infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
9. See Order Amending the Schedule to the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act, SOR/98-393 (in force July 20, 1998).
10. Infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
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environmental regulation. The following section presents a
framework for the analysis of this issue. The third section offers
a brief history and technical background of the MMT case in
both Canada and the United States. The fourth section outlines
and evaluates the positions of the different stakeholders involved on an issue-by-issue basis. The fifth section examines the
domestic and international trade law questions raised in this
dispute, and the sixth section reviews some of the more general
trade policy issues. Finally, the Article concludes that Bill C-29
has more to do with the establishment of universal fuel standards and the protection of a fledgling industry than with environmental protection.
II.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The issues raised by the MMT case are especially salient in
the larger context of an integrated North American marketplace. As economies become more interdependent throughout
the international trading system, environmental, health, and
safety regulations can have a profound impact on international
trade and investment. 1 There is a general perception that
firms and their governments are attempting to fill the "protection gap" left by falling border barriers with the discriminatory
application of environmental regulation. 12 These new non-tariff
barriers have been documented by a growing interdisciplinary
literature. 13
11. See David Vogel, Trouble for Us and Trouble for Them: Social Regulations as Trade Barriers,in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES? SOCIAL REGULATIONS
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Pietro S. Nivola, ed., 1997). The issue in the present case is the flipside of the "race to the bottom" scenario where nations lower
environmental regulation among jurisdictions to reduce the cost of production
and attract foreign investment. The theoretical framework in the present case
involves the use of higher standards to exclude competition from the market to
protect domestic industry.
12. See Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, Trade Liberalizationand
Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 5 (1998).
13. See RUGMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at ch. 1. The OECD has studied this
issue as reported in OECD, REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET
OPENNESS (1996). See also Alan M. Rugman and Julie A. Soloway, Corporate
Strategy and NAFTA - When Environmental Regulations are Barriers to
Trade, 3 J. TRANSNAT'L MGMT. DEV. 2, 3-4 (1998); see generally ALAN 0. SYKES,
PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS
(1995); DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, VOL. 2: LEGAL ANALYSIS (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert

E. Hudec, eds., 1996).
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What was the rationale behind the ban on MMT? Was Bill
C-29 enacted to promote industrial rather than environmental
interests? This question is illuminated by a "Baptist-Bootlegger" framework, a subset of the economic literature on regulation. The literature posits that industry regulation is a function
14
of the demands of a coalition of two special-interest groups.
The term Baptist-Bootlegger emanates from the prohibition era,
when the sale of alcohol was illegal in the United States. 15 Both
Baptists and Bootleggers generally supported prohibition,
although for very different reasons. 16 Baptists supported prohibition for moral reasons, believing that it served the public interest, while Bootleggers sought to benefit from the high prices
that could be charged for black-market alcohol.' 7 The first
group has a public interest agenda; they seek to reduce the public's exposure to potentially harmful products.1 8 The second
group, often an industry, has a wealth maximization agenda and
benefits from a regulation that gives them some special advantage, for instance by raising their competitors' costs or creating
barriers to entry. 19 This group's case is not explicitly stated but
is clothed in a public interest justification, thereby giving a public dimension to what "otherwise would be a strictly private venture. ' 20 Thus the existence of a Baptist-Bootlegger coalition can
provide evidence of a protectionist intent on the part of
legislators.
This framework does not consider in-depth the intentions of
the government in forming a regulation. But the wishes of Baptists and Bootleggers do not passively flow through the legislature. The "state is not a unified actor," as it does not legislate
14.

See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in the Market for Regula-

tion, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GovERNMENT REGULATION, (Jason F.
Shogren, ed., 1989). See generally VOGEL, supra note 13.
15. See VOGEL, supra note 13, at 20-22.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Yandle, supra note 14, at 34. There are important caveats to the Baptist-Bootlegger framework. From a global welfare perspective, the fact that the
Baptists pursue a public interest agenda does not necessarily mean that the
fulfillment of their agenda is welfare-maximizing. There are trade-offs that
need to be made between, for example, whether a given piece of land should be
a strip mall or a wildlife conservation park. If the piece of land in question is in
a remote town in Northern Ontario where a large population and no stores exist, arguably developing the land into retail stores would increase the welfare of
the local population more than a park. The converse may be true in a large
urban centre such as Toronto, Ontario.
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with a single purpose and intent.2 1 Public choice theory states
that legislators respond to and trade off diverse values and interests. 22 Each component of government seeks the fulfillment
of different agendas which play out interactively in the decisionmaking process. 2 3 The intent of the government is difficult, if
not impossible, to discern with any certainty. Yet the key to defining legislation as "protectionist" is finding legislative intent.
The focus on intent as an indicia of protectionism has limited
value, and other indicia may be better able to identify protectionist legislation. To some degree both NAFTA and GATT have
a lack of a jurisadopted an intent test. There remains, however,
24
prudential basis for making this judgment.
A second line of inquiry may provide more insight into the
present question. A welfare analysis may produce a more objective indicator to help determine when states are acting legitimately and when they are disguising illegitimate protectionist
ends. This would entail an inquiry into whether the global welfare losses from restricting trade grossly outweigh the regulatory benefits. This would require asking whether the regulation
is an effective and efficient tool for reaching its stated goal. An
environmental regulation that imposes a high economic burden
to yield marginal environmental results will not increase net social welfare and may indicate that it serves the interests of a
small rent-seeking group. 25 It also requires measuring the impact on global welfare that the restriction on trade may have,
such as higher prices, restricted choices for consumers, or retaliatory measures undertaken by trading partners. The concept of
applying a cost-benefit analysis to environmental regulation has
received recent attention 26 and has been incorporated into inter21. William A. Kerr, Removing Health, Sanitaryand Technical Non-Tariff
Barriers in NAFTA- A New Institutional Economics Paradigm, 31 J. WORLD
TRADE 57, 57-74 (1997).
22. See generally ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND EcoNOMIC THEORY (1994); Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice and the Economic
Analysis of Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS (Nicholas Mercurio, ed., 1989).

23. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 61-62.
24. See NAFTA chs. 7 & 9 and the GATT art. XX, TBT, and SPS Agreements. See also Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International
Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not)
Be Drawn From the Jurisprudence of the Dormant Commerce Clause (Aug. 2829, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the World Trade Forum). See
generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
25. See Vogel, supra note 11.
26. See generally RISKS, COSTS AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS
FROM REGULATION (1996); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:
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national trade agreements through least-trade-restrictive
means tests. The primary question here remains whether "reasonably available" less restrictive alternatives are able to attain
the same level of regulatory benefit. 27 This raises difficult "measuring" questions about the value of a given regulation, especially when the underlying science is controversial. For the most
part, however, NAFTA and GATT law and jurisprudence do not
employ a welfare analysis.
III.

HISTORY AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

MMT stands for methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl,28 an organometallic compound used as an octane enhancer in gasoline. 2 9 Refiners add gasoline octane-enhancers
such as MMT to increase fuel efficiency. 30 Ethyl Corporation of
Richmond, Virginia developed MMT in 1953 and is currently its
sole manufacturer in North America. 3 1 MMT is marketed
under the trade name HiTEC©3000.3 2 Ethyl has a blending
plant in Corunna, Ontario which imports MMT and then sells it
to Canadian refiners to add to their gasoline. 3 3 Environmental
protection groups have raised three central claims surrounding
the environmental dangers of MMT, each of which will be more
fully explored in the following section. First, they contend that
MMT poses a significant and serious health hazard through direct tailpipe emissions of toxic manganese oxides into the enviTOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). See also David Orden and
Eduardo Romano, The Avocado Dispute and Other Technical Barriers to Agricultural Trade Under NAFTA (paper presented at the conference on NAFTA
and Agriculture: Is the Experiment Working? San Antonio, TX, November
1996) (on file with author).
27. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, Trade Policy and Domestic Health and Safety Standards, in THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (2d ed.) (forthcoming 1998).
28. See STANDING SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NATuRAL RESOURCES, INTERIM REPORT CONCERNING BILL C-29, ANACTTO REGULATE
INTER-PROVINCIAL TRADE IN AND IMPORTATION FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES OF

CERTAIN MANGANESE-BASED SUBSTANCES (Can.) (Mar. 4, 1997) (on file with
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinafter STANDING COMMITTEE].
29. See id.
30. Ethyl Corporation contends that MMT enables gasoline refiners to increase Research Octane Numbers up to approximately 1.5 to 2 units. According
to the Canadian Petroleum Products Institute (CPPI), the amount of MMT in
gasoline in 1993 ranged from 0 to 17.2 milligrams of manganese per litre. In
1996, the Canadian General Standards Board set a maximum allowable
amount of 18 milligrams per litre. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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ronment. 34 Debate over the degree of health risk created by
MMT has precipitated significant controversy about the level of
manganese oxide in the atmosphere that is acceptable for
human health. 3 5 Second, environmentalists claim that MMT increases overall auto emissions, particularly smog-forming particulates. 3 6 Third, MMT opponents allege that MMT causes
auto emissions control systems to malfunction, resulting in increased emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide that
37
have corresponding adverse health and environmental effects.
1.

MMT in Canada
MMT has been widely used in Canadian gasoline since

1977, when it was introduced as a replacement for lead.38 The

first initiative to have MMT removed from gasoline came before
the legislature in October 1990 in the form of a Private Member's Bill, which was never enacted into law. 3 9 The bill was introduced during a time of increasing environmental concerns
about fuel additives and the availability of "cleaner substitutes."40 Former Environment Minister Sheila Copps next attempted to ban MMT through the introduction of Bill C-94 in
May 1995, which died on the order paper in February 1996.41 It
was reintroduced in the House of Commons by then-Environment Minister Sergio Marchi as Bill C-29.42 A Standing Senate
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Environment Canada, Government Reintroduces MMT Bill C-94
(electronic press release Apr. 19, 1996) <http://www.eg.gc.ca/press/mmt-pe.htm>.
39. A Private Member's bill is a bill sponsored by a Member of Parliament
who is not part of the Cabinet. The term usually refers to public bills. They
require unanimous approval of Parliament to move forward and thus rarely
become enacted into law. See House of Commons Canada, Glossary of Parliamentary Procedure (visited Aug. 1998) <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/refmat/glossary/gloss-e.htm> [hereinafter Glossary].
40. See Interview with Hon. Ralph Ferguson, Former Minister of Agriculture, in Toronto, Can. (July 10, 1997) (on file with the author). Mr. Ferguson
was responsible for introducing a Private Members' Bill in the House of Commons to ban MMT. Id.
41. The order paper is the "official agenda of the House of Commons, published for each sitting day, listing all items that may be brought forward on that
particular day." It is renewed each session, so that if a session ends and a bill
has not passed and is not carried forward, it is said to "die on the order paper."
See Glossary, supra note 39. See also Barrie McKenna, Fuel-additive Bill Expected to Stay Dead?, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 8, 1996, at B1, B6.
42. See STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 28.
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Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources
convened to consider Bill C-29 in February 1997. 43 The ban on
on
MMT passed its third reading in the Canadian Parliament
44
April 25, 1997 and entered into force on June 24, 1997.
45
2. MMT in the United States

MMT was banned from use in the United States between
1977 and 1995.46 Since 1977, the Environmental Protection
of fuel additives to obtain a
Agency has required producers
"waiver" for the use of MMT. 4 7 Ethyl applied for a waiver in
1978, 1981, 1990 and 1991.48 Each request was denied by the
EPA. Ethyl's requests failed to meet the conditions of section
211(f)(4) of the U.S. Clean Air Act, 4 9 which requires the applicant to establish that "fuel or fuel additives and the emission
products of such fuel or fuel additives will not cause or contribute to the failure of any emission control or device over the use50
ful life of any vehicle in which such device or system is used."
The EPAjustified the denial of Ethyl's applications based on
"insufficient data" and required additional tests to be undertaken in each instance. Ethyl appealed the January 1991 denial
of an EPA waiver to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. In April 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals remanded
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See generally Steve Pocalyko, Note, Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency: Circuit Court Limits EPA Administrator'sDiscretion Under
Waiver Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 183 (1995).

46. Lead began to be phased out from gasoline at around the same time.
The EPA writes,
[ead has been blended with gasoline, primarily to boost octane levels,
since the early 1920s. EPA began working to reduce lead emissions
soon after its inception, issuing the first reduction standards in 1973,
which called for a gradual phasedown of lead.... In 1975, passenger
cars and light trucks were manufactured with a more elaborate emission control system which included a catalytic converter that required
lead-free fuel.
See Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Takes Final Steps in Phaseout of
Leaded Gasoline (electronic press release Jan. 29, 1996) <http://www.epa.gov/
orcdizux/gopher/Fuels/Additive/Lead/pre-lead.txt>.
47. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
48. See id. See also Ethyl Corporation, MMT Timeline (visited Sept. 9,
1998) <ethyl.comltime.html>.
49. See Clean Air Act of 1955, §§ 202, 211(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521, 7545
(1988 & Supp. V (1993)). See also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Regulation of Fuels
and Fuel Additives Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29 TuLsA L. J. 485
(1994).
50. Testimony of C. Hicks of Ethyl Corporation (May 2, 1997), in STANDING
COMMITTEE, supra note 28.
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Ethyl's waiver application for reconsideration by the EPA. In
July 1994, however, the EPA denied Ethyl's waiver application
again. Although Ethyl had demonstrated that use of MMT did
not "cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control or
device," 5 1 the EPA later found that there was "a reasonable basis for concern regarding the potential adverse effects on public
health which could result from the emissions of manganese particulates associated with MMT use."5 2 Ethyl again appealed
this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which ruled in Ethyl's
favor.5 3 The Court found that the EPA had exceeded its statutory authority under section 211(f)(4) of the Clean Air Act. A
waiver application can be granted or denied only if the fuel additive "will cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control
device or system." The section does not contemplate the denial
of a waiver based on a public health effect. Accordingly, the EPA
granted a waiver for MMT on July 17, 1995.54 Although MMT is
now a legal fuel additive in the United States, its use is not
widespread. Presently, U.S. gasoline firms representing over
70% of gasoline produced in the United States are not using
MMT. 5 5 The firms may not be using MMT because of environmental concerns, or they may not want to undergo expensive
capital changes to blending facilities in order to use the additive,
which had been banned for the previous 17 years. It is also possible that they are waiting to see how this issue is finally settled
before making any changes to their operations.
IV. STAKEHOLDER POSITIONS
In both the United States and Canada, a number of powerful stakeholders have become involved in the MMT dispute.
Some have expressed environmental concerns; others have
raised economic and legal issues. In order to analyze the questions posed at the outset of this Article, it is necessary to outline
51. Fuels and Fuel Additives: Extension of Time and Findings Concerning
Fuel Additive Waiver Applications, 58 Fed. Reg. 64761 (1993).
52. Fuel and Additives; Grant of Waiver Application, 60 Fed. Reg. 36414
(1995).
53. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

54. See id.
55. See Environmental Defense Fund, Makers of Over 70% of U.S. Gasoline
Reject MMT Use (electronic press release May 1, 1996) <http://www.edf.org/
pubs/EDF-Letter/1996/May/a-mmt.html>. The oil companies that have con-

firmed in letters to the Environmental Defence Fund that they are not presently using MMT are Amoco, Anchor, ARCO, BP, Chevron, Conoco, Exxon,
Hess, Marathon Oil, Mobil, Pennzoil, Phillips, Shell, Sun and Texaco. See id.
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the claims of the stakeholders by issue and attempt to evaluate
their validity.
1.

The Environmental Claims

Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs)
both in Canada and the United States have exerted considerable
effort to have MMT banned as a fuel additive. Large coalitions
have formed in both Canada and the United States.5 6 The coalition in the United States, led by the Environmental Defense
Fund, claims to represent thirty-seven environmental, medical,
senior citizens, consumer, and religious groups totaling more
57
than 14 million members in the United States and Canada.
Environmental groups are concerned about the toxic effects of
56. Groups opposed to MMT in Canada are represented by the Coalition for
Banning MMT and include the following organizations: Allergy/Asthma Information Association, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers in
Canada, Canadian Automobile Association, Canadian Institute of Child Health,
Council of Canadians, the Cities of North York and Toronto Public Health Departments, Environmental Defense Fund, Learning Disabilities Association of
Canada, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association of Canada, Ontario Public
Health Association, Pollution Probe and Sierra Club of Canada. See Canada
Newswire, Coalition Want MMT-Free Fuel for CanadiansNow (electronic press
release Sept. 18, 1996) <www.newswire.ca> (on file with MiNN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE) [hereinafter Canada Newswire]. Groups opposed to MMT in the United
States include the following organizations: Environmental Defense Fund, Alliance to End Childhood Lead Poisoning, American Lung Association of Massachusetts, American Psychological Association, Boston Women's Health Book
Collective, Centre for Auto Safety, Centre for Environmental Legal Studies,
Clean Air Council, Coalition to End Childhood Lead Poisoning, Conservation
Law Foundation, Consumer's Union, Environmental Advocates, Environmental
Health Watch, Friends of the Earth, Harbour-UCLA Research and Education
Institute, Intercommunity Centre for Justice and Peace, The Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, Kentucky Resources Council, Inc., Lead Safe California,
League of Conservation Voters, Learning Disabilities Association of Canada,
Learning Disability Association, Montana Environmental Information Centre,
National Parks and Conservation Assoc., National Wildlife Federation, Natural
Resources Council of Maine, Natural Resources Defense Council, New Jersey
City Action, Parkinson's Action Network, Parkinson's Disease Foundation, Inc.,
Physicians for Social Responsibility, Population Action International, Sierra
Club, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc., Society for the Developmental and
Behavioural Pediatrics, United Methodist Board of Church and Society, U.S.
Public Interest Research Group, Zero Population Growth. See Letter from Environmental Defense Fund, to Mr. L.G. Rawl, Chairman and CEO, Exxon Corporation (Feb. 14, 1996) (on file with Mi-N. J. GLOBAL TRADE) [hereinafter EDF
Letter]; Environmental Defense Fund, Consumers Union Says "No" to MMT
(electronic press release July 1, 1996) <http:www.edf.org/pubs/EDF-Letter/
1996/Julj-cummt.html>.
57. See EDF Letter, supra note 56; Sierra Club, EnvironmentalistsHail
Minister's Decision to Ban MMT (electronic press release Apr. 19, 1996) <http:ll
www.sierraclub.org/canada/national/media/mmtl .txt>.
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high levels of airborne manganese. 58 Manganese is emitted
from autos in very fine particles which enter the lungs. 59 Adults
can usually metabolize manganese if it is contained in food, but
when manganese is absorbed into the lungs, it accumulates in
the body.60 At high levels of exposure, manganese settles primarily in the brain, causing neurological impairments with
symptoms similar to Parkinson's disease. 6 1 Studies have suggested that manganese affects behavioral characteristics and
learning ability in children. 62 The ENGOs are also concerned
that the public health effects of longer-term, lower-dose exposures resulting from MMT use cannot be adequately assessed
due to a lack of scientific data. 63 Accordingly, the ENGOs believe that there are sufficient indications of harmful effects to
justify a ban on MMT. 64 The ENGOs advocate a ban pursuant

to the precautionary principle, which states that action may be
taken before the scientific evidence is exhaustive and conclusive
so that the public is not used as a testing ground for potentially
65
harmful products.
In addition to the impact of airborne manganese, the
ENGOs allege that MMT increases smog through its disabling
effects on auto emissions control equipment and catalytic converters, thereby causing human respiratory problems. 6 6
Although the ENGOs concede that there is some reduction in
nitrous oxide (NO' ) emissions through the use of MMT, they
contend that such a benefit is minimal and far outweighed by
67
the potential harms.
On the other side of this debate, Ethyl claims that there are
"important environmental and economic benefits associated
with MMT." 6 8 Ethyl writes:
58.

See EDF Letter, supra note 56; Sierra Club, supra note 57.

59. See Gina Solomon MD, MPH, MMT Manganese in Gasoline:Potential
Public Health Effects (visited July 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/psr/index.html> (on file with Minnesota Journalof Global Trade).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See EDF Letter, supra note 56; Sierra Club, supra note 57.
64. See id.
65. See Environmental Defense Fund, EnvironmentalDefense Fund Urges
Oil Firms to Take a Strong "No MMT" Pledge (electronic press release July 30,
1996) <http://www/edf/org/pubs/newsreleases/1996/jul/e%Fnommt.html>.
66. See Canada NewsWire, supra note 56.
67. See id.
68. Ethyl Corporation, MMT Q&A (visited Sept. 9, 1998) <www.ethyl.com/
mmtqa.html>.
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Studies have proven that MMT is good for the environment. MMT in
gasoline can reduce smog-related nitrogen oxide emissions from automobile tailpipes by 20 percent, as well as reduce tailpipe emissions of
carbon monoxide. In addition, MMT could cut noxious pollutants created annually during the refining process by 10 billion pounds of carbon dioxide, 11 million pounds of nitrogen oxide, 3 million pounds of
carbon monoxide and 150,000 pounds of sulfur dioxide. For refineries,
MMT is a cost-effective octane improver that saves energy by reducing
crude oil consumption. Use of the additive would lessen U.S. depena year, creating a
dence on foreign crude oil by up to 30 million barrels
69
savings to refiners of up to $500 million a year.

These conclusions were challenged in a study commissioned by

the Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Association (MVMA). 7 0 This
study found that the "scientific rigour of the experiments is uncertain" and improvements in NO' emissions were considerably
overestimated. 7 1 The Senate Standing Committee considered
the available scientific evidence and found that there "appears
to be insufficient data to conclude that the emission of manganese resulting from the combustion of MMT in gasoline does not

pose a public health problem." 72 Despite the evidence introduced by ENGOs supporting the allegation that MMT is a dangerous neurotoxin, the Senate Committee based its conclusion
on a 1995 Health Canada risk assessment of MMT's health im-

plications which found that "manganese emissions from MMT
are unlikely to pose a risk to health for any sub-group of the

population.

'7 3

The Senate Committee did find that if "MMT use

is proven to cause increases in emissions of HC, CO and NO x, it

could pose a public health risk," although it later found that use
74
of MMT actually reduced NOX.
It is difficult to ascertain the degree of health risk posed by
the use of MMT in gasoline, given the wide divergence of scientific evidence on this topic and the lack of consensus even within
the Canadian federal government. 75

It is significant to note

that MMT has not passed the thresholds required in order to be
banned as a toxic substance under the Canadian Environmental
69. Id.
70. See B. Abraham & J.F. Lawless, Analysis of 1988 and 1992-93 Ethyl
Corporation Test Fleet HC and NO' Emissions, Institute for Improvement in
Quality and Productivity (Oct. 18, 1995) (on file with Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade).
71. Id.
72. STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 28.
73. Testimony of D. Krewski, Health Canada (June 2, 1997), in STANDING
COMMIrrEE,

74.
75.

supra note 28.

STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 28.
See id.
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Protection Act (CEPA).7 6 Article 34 of CEPA would allow a ban
on MMT as a "toxic substance," but this would require Health
Canada to declare it as such, which it has not done due to a lack
of supporting evidence. 7 7 Articles 46 and 47 of CEPA would
permit a ban on MMT if there were clear evidence that it would
impair the functioning of vehicle equipment. 78 The "precautionary principle" approach is not included in this part of CEPA; the
Act imposes a high standard requiring evidence to be definitive. 79 Environment Canada decided not to proceed by this
route because of the inconclusive and contradictory evidence on
whether MMT impaired the functioning of vehicle equipment.8 0
2.

The Protected Industry Claim

Environment Canada introduced Bill C-29 as part of a
"Clean Air Agenda" designed to improve air quality.8 1 The
agenda prioritizes "new car emission standards, new fuel effi82
ciency rules and new encouragement for alternative fuels."
This item originated from a set of recommendations by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) Task
76. CEPA, supra note 5.
77. See id. at § 34(1)(1).
78. See generally id.
79. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. This may soon change. A
recent proposal to amend CEPA died on the order paper in the Canadian Parliament, but may be reintroduced. There were significant increases in the
power of CEPA to "enshrine pollution prevention as a national goal". See Environment Canada, Environmental ProtectionLegislationDesignedfor the Future
- A Renewed CEPA: A Response to the Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development outlined in its Fifth Report (visited Oct. 9, 1998) <http://www.ec.gc.ca/cepa/govtresp/efront/html>.
80. See Telephone Interview with Frank Vena, Environment Canada (July
8, 1997).
81. The Clean Air Agenda contains five priorities as outlined by Minister
Sergio Marchi:
1) The health of Canadians; 2) federal leadership on national environmental standards and the modernization of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act; 3) new car emission standards, new fuel
efficiency rules and new encouragement for alternative fuels; 4) building environmental citizenship and partnership across Canadian society; and 5) vigorous bilateral and multilateral action.
Minister of the Environment Sergio Marchi, Address at Transportation, Air
Quality, and Human Health Conference at York University, Toronto (Apr. 25,
1996) (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.doe.ca/minister/speeches/sust-s_e.
html>.
82. Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment Task Force on
Cleaner Vehicles and Fuels, Report to the Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment, at (Oct. 23, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with Minnesota Journalof Global Trade) [hereinafter Report to Canadian Council].
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Force on Cleaner Vehicles and Fuels.8 3 The recommendations
were developed through a consultative process which included,
among others, representatives from ENGOs.8 4 The CCME report's first recommendation was to adopt "tighter new vehicle
emission standards in harmony with the United States."8 5 Its
second recommendation was to develop and support "alternative
transportation fuels and advanced technology vehicles." 8 6 The
report's fifth recommendation established maximum sulphur
content for low-sulphur diesel fuels.8 7 The sixth recommendation set maximum amounts of toxic chemicals that contribute to
air pollution and ozone depletion: benzene, aromatics, olefins,
and sulphur.8 8 The report concluded that by following these recommendations there would be significant reductions in fine par-

ticulate matter, ozone, and toxic emissions.8 9 Corresponding
health benefits would accrue to Canadians over the next twentythree years: mortality would be reduced by up to 4,400 cases,
chronic bronchitis by up to 29,600 cases, and cancer by up to 60
cases. 90 The report further claimed that the economic benefits
could reach $31 billion over the same time period. 9 1
The report did not directly address the issue of MMT, but it
did so indirectly through the support of stricter standards and
specific ceilings on pollution-causing chemicals. 9 2 The level of
emissions established by this report could not be met by the current automobile technology and the continued use of fuel containing MMT. 9 3 The report also highlighted that the MMT issue
is really part of a larger framework in which fuel formulations
are coming under increasing scrutiny, particularly other fuel adCanada
ditives such as benzene and sulphur. 94 Environment
95
has initiated action on all of these recommendations.
83. See id.
84. See Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Communiqu6:
Environment Ministers Endorse Tougher Standards for Vehicles and Fuels
(Oct. 24, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade).
85. Report to the Canadian Council, supra note 82, at iii.
86. Id. at iv.
87. See id. at vi.
88. See id at vi-viii.
89. See id. at 61.
90. See id. at "Table of Health Benefits: Estimated Health Benefits (19972020) for Canada."
91. See id.
92. See id. at vi-viii.
93. See id.
94. See Report to the Canadian Council, supra note 85, at vi-viii.
95. See id.
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In furtherance of these recommendations and the Clean Air
Agenda, the issue of alternative fuel additives has moved into
the spotlight. 9 6 Ethanol, produced primarily from corn, burns
cleaner than MMT but is more expensive to produce. 9 7 The ethanol industry claims that the use of ethanol in gasoline will result in a 25-30% reduction in emissions of carbon monoxide and
an unspecified reduction in the emissions of particulate matter,
air toxins, and ozone. 9 8 Unlike fossil fuels, ethanol is produced
from renewable biological feedstocks such as grain.9 9
Ethanol proponents also allege that the use of ethanol as a
fuel additive will benefit the economy. 10 0 The Renewable Fuels
Association writes that increased ethanol production "will provide a new market for agricultural products - improving financial stability and security for farmers - in addition to direct
and indirect employment opportunities for all aspects of ethanol production: from farming to transportation and manufacturing."1 0 1
The industry further argues that prices will fall as production increases and economies of scale are achieved. 10 2 Cur10 3
rently, only four plants in Canada produce ethanol.
Commercial Alcohol owns two plants, one recently built in Chatham, Ontario and the other in Tiverton, Ontario. 10 4 Other producers own plants in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 10 5 Among
the economic claims of the plant in Chatham are the creation of
400 direct and indirect jobs, a new annual market for 15 million
bushels of locally-produced corn, and additional economic activ96. See id.
97. See Commercial Alcohol, Fuel Ethanol, the Environmentally Friendly
Fuel (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <wysiwyg://www.comalc.com/fuelethanol.htm>
[hereinafter Fuel Ethanol]; Renewable Fuels Association, Less Pollution (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http://ethanolrfa.orgrfa.html>; Canadian Renewable Fuels
Association, Just How Environmentally Friendly is Ethanol? (visited Oct. 30,
1998) <www.greenfuels.org/ethanenv2/html>. There is currently a strong and
effective U.S. ethanol lobby which has succeeded in securing tax incentives for
the ethanol industry. See Renewable Fuels Association, 51 ETHANOL REP., June
26, 1997 (on file with Minnesota Journalof Global Trade) [hereinafter Ethanol
Report].
98. See Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, supra note 97.
99. See Ethanol Report, supra note 97.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See Telephone Interview with Jim Johnson, President, Canadian Renewable Fuels Association (July 10, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter interview with Jim Johnson].
104. See Fuel Ethanol, supra note 97.

105. See Interview with Jim Johnson, supra note 103.
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ity from trucking maintenance and supplies required for the
plant.'0 6 Commercial Alcohol has also stated that its product
contains over 75% Canadian content. Its press release cited a
number of additional Canadian suppliers that had substantial
10 7
contracts in place at the time the Chatham plant was built.
Environment Canada has provided financial support to
Canada's fledgling ethanol industry. 10 8 Environment Canada
has also justified the introduction of the ban on MMT, stating:
[tihe removal of MMT from Canadian gasoline presents an opportunity

for the introduction and use of ethanol and other substitutes which
could form an important element of a broader-based national policy on
the domestic production and use of renewable energy sources. Such a
policy would be consistent with the Red Book commitment in the Liberal Party of Canada Agricultural Policy Paper to eliminate MMT from
gasoline. 109

Again, supporters of an MMT ban cite reasons other than
legitimate environmental concerns for banning MMT. They
seek to provide "shelter" for a domestic infant industry competing with a mature United States industry. 110 This brings into
question the motivations of the Canadian Government in passing Bill C-29, as it appears to be responding to the strong agriculture lobby pressing for protection and assistance."' David
Vogel has found a similar political economy of ethanol in the
United States, where a powerful farm lobby exists. 1 12 He notes
that ethanol has historically been a heavily subsidized and protected industry not for its dubious environmental benefits, but
because it increases farm income and reduces U.S. dependence
on imported oil.113
The Canadian Petroleum Products Institute (CPPI) represents all major oil producers in Canada and has raised concerns
106. See Commercial Alcohol, (electronic press release Oct. 1, 1996) <http:l
www.comalc.com/pressreleases.htm:ChathamOfficial>.
107. See id.
108. See Interview with Jim Johnson, supra note 103.
109. Environment Canada, News Release and Backgrounderto the Press Release: Government Reintroduces MMT Bill C-94 (electronic press release Apr.
18, 1996) <http://www.ec.gc.ca/press/mmt-b-e.html>.
110. See ALAN RUGMAN & ALAIN VERBEKE, GLOBAL CORPORATE STRATEGY &
TRADE POLICY

69-74 (1990).

111. Terence Corcoran has written that "the other federal agenda is to cater
to the growing ethanol lobby. Mr. Marchi explicitly acknowledged that the
MMT ban is part of a government policy to boost ethanol, which is manufactured from corn grown in numerous Liberal ridings around Ontario." Terence
Corcoran, Introducing Sheila Marchi, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 27, 1996, at B2.
112. See Vogel, supra note 11, at 112.
113. See id.

MHiNv. J GLoBAL TRADE

[Vol. 8:55

about the environmental claims of the ethanol industry. 114 The
CPPI argues that a full environmental life-cycle analysis (i.e.,
from the growth of the corn to the burning of the fuel) must be
undertaken to evaluate ethanol's environmental benefits. 11 5 Vogel notes that ethanol is not clearly more environmentally
friendly than its alternatives. 1 16 One study undertaken by the
National Academy of Sciences in the United States found that
"while [ethanol blends] would reduce carbon monoxide emissions by 25 percent, hydrocarbons would increase by as much as
50 percent and nitrogen oxide by 15 percent" and that "[e]thanol
may also contribute to ozone pollution (smog) because it evaporates relatively quickly." 11 7 The study concluded that "using
ethanol as a blending agent in gasoline . . .would not achieve

significant air-quality benefits and, in fact, would likely to be
[sic] detrimental. 1 1 8
The CPPI is particularly concerned about the resolution of
the MMT controversy because other octane enhancers (e.g.,
sulphur and benzene) will be considered under the Clean Air
Agenda.' 1 9 The CPPI alleges that the cost of oil refineries cutting sulphur from gasoline would be high.' 20 A recent draft report by a joint committee of industry and government examined
the health and economic benefits of reducing sulphur pollution
from cars and trucks. 1 2 1 It estimated that "sixteen refineries
would have to spend nearly $1.8 billion to cut the sulphur in
their gasoline to the California benchmark" and that "millions
1 22
more would have to be spent annually on operating costs."

3.

The Emissions Control Malfunction Claims

The Canadian Vehicles Manufacturers Association (CVMA)
has consistently supported a ban on MMT since the early
114. See Interview with Brendan Hawley, Vice-President, Government Relations, Canadian Petroleum Products Institute, at Ottawa, Ontario (Apr. 1996)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Interview with Brendan Hawley].
115. See id.
116. Vogel, supra note 11, at 114.
117. Id. (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 114 n.8 (quoting James Bovard, Corporate Welfare Fueled by
Political Contributions,94 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 24, 26-27 (1995)).
119. See Interview with Brendan Hawley, supra note 114.
120. See id.
121. The Financial Post obtained copies of these reports, which are not
available to date. See John Geddes, Refiners Facing Heavy Costs, FIN. POST,
Apr. 10, 1997, at 10.
122. Id.
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1990s. 1 23 The CVMA represents all twenty-two manufacturers

that supply automobiles to the Canadian market and has done
extensive testing and research on the effects of MMT on
automobiles. 124 It claims that MMT leaves residues in the auto
systems that have an adverse effect on oxygen sensors and cata125
lytic converters and are responsible for spark plug misfires.
As the vehicle manufacturers have anticipated the new generation of emissions standards, the majority of 1996 vehicles for
sale in Canada met 1996 United States emissions requirements. 12 6 Beginning in 1998, the Onboard Diagnostic System II
(OBD I) became a mandatory component of emissions control
systems. 27 MMT residues affect the monitoring of catalysts
and affect malfunction indicator lights which identify to drivers
emissions-related problems in vehicles.' 28 Indicator failure has
led to an increase in warranty claims and corresponding costs,
which are passed along to consumers.' 29 Some manufacturers
have gone so far as to write exclusions from liability into their
warranties if the consumer uses MMT gasoline.1 30 Manufacturers are further threatening to withdraw the industry-standard
100,000 kilometer warranty if MMT is not removed from gasoline. 13 1 This would have an enormous impact on Canadian
consumers.
The CVMA further argues that
motor vehicle emissions control has almost exclusively focused on vehicle hardware. To meet continuing demands for better ambient air
quality, the potential improvements available through gasoline formulation and regular emissions inspection maintenance programs in
densely populated areas must be pursued in addition to the further
123. See Interview with Mark Nantais, President, Canadian Vehicle Manufacturing Association, in Toronto, Ont. (July 11, 1997) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Interview with Mark Nantais].
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Association and the Association of
International Automobile Manufacturers of Canada, The Impact of ManganeseBased Fuel Additives on Vehicle Emission Control Technology in Canada: A
Report for Submission to the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (Oct. 24, 1995) (on file with Minnesota Journalof Global
Trade) [hereinafter MVMA].
129. See id. (noting that "[wiarranty claims and consumer complaints continue to indicate the adverse effects of MMT in areas such as spark plugs, oxygen sensors and catalysts").
130. See Interview with Mark Nantais, supra note 123.
131. See id.; Les Sillars, High-octane Regionalism, W. REP., Nov. 18, 1996.
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gains which can be attained through technologically advanced vehicle
13 2
control hardware.

The CVMA has invested over $4 billion in research and development to meet the new emissions standards, which remove
up to 98% of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxide
from exhaust emissions. 133 This technology is at risk of becoming ineffective with the use of MMT. 134 The major auto firms
perform joint venture research to develop the technology and
target its use for a single North American market. The United
States emissions standards, while undergoing revision, are currently more stringent than Canadian standards. 13 5 However,
different technology cannot be developed for different jurisdictions; it must be viable for the whole continent, which further
supports the auto industry's goal of a harmonized gasoline standard.1 36 The CVMA contends that it is impossible to meet the
"incessant demands for lower and lower emissions" while MMT
is in gasoline. 13 7 It argues for a team effort which would include
the full participation of consumers, fuel suppliers, maintenance
providers, and numerous governmental agencies' 38 in order to
continue to minimize adverse environmental effects.
In response to these claims, the Canadian Petroleum Products Institute (CPPI) commissioned a study of the effects of
MMT on vehicle emissions monitoring systems.' 39 The study
tested 206 vehicles with an aggregate mileage of 11.4 million kilometers. 140 The study found "no evidence of any negative effect
on 180 of 185 test vehicles, four vehicles had problems unrelated
to the use of MMT, and one had problems resulting from a faulty
spark plug.'' 14 1 Additional testing conducted by Ethyl found
that MMT had no effect on OBD II or any other vehicle
equipment.142
132. MVMA, supra note 129.
133. See Interview with Mark Nantais, supra note 123.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that the world's major vehicle manufacturers would be the first to support the additive if it had the
claimed benefits).
138. See id.
139. See Canada NewsWire, Province's Concern Over MMT Ban Confirmed
By New Study Released Today, (electronic press release Oct. 29, 1996)
<www.newswire.ca>.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at Appendix.
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In its review of Bill C-29, the Senate Standing Committee
considered whether MMT did indeed cause OBD malfunctioning. 143 The Committee noted the inconsistencies in the evidence
but concluded that "based on the preponderance of the evidence,
[sic] the government was justified in invoking the precautionary
principle and introducing Bill C-29 as the responsible, prudent
'144
course of action.
Given this divergent and highly technical evidence, it is
hard to evaluate the harm that MMT does cause emissions control systems. Admittedly, the auto industry's real concern is
whether a North American industry standard will emerge in
fuel and hardware that will allow them to capitalize best on
their investment in technology development. One North American standard in one North American market would allow producers to achieve economies of scale. In that sense, losing this
battle could have a detrimental economic impact on them.
V.

THE LEGAL CHALLENGES

The MMT regulation has been challenged in four different
legal processes. First, within the Canadian domestic courts,
Ethyl challenged Bill C-29 on constitutional grounds, asserting
that it amounted to "an unwarranted intrusion into an area of
provincial jurisdiction." 145 At the time the regulation was repealed, the case had not gone to trial. Second, the Government
of Alberta, backed by the Governments of Quebec, Nova Scotia,
and Saskatchewan brought and subsequently won a dispute
under Canada's Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT). 14 6 Third,
Ethyl initiated an action under NAFTA's investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism (Chapter 11),147 which was ultimately
settled in favor of Ethyl before a decision was rendered. 148
Fourth, Ethyl attempted to bring a claim under NAFTA's state143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Barrie McKenna, Alberta Vows to Challenge Federal Ban on Gas Additive, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 31, 1997, at B8 (referring to a statement made by
Bruce Campbell, an Ethyl lawyer); Thomas Claridge, Ethyl Canada Opens Second Front on MMT, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 27, 1997, at B4.
146. See infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
147. See U.S. May Challenge Canadavia NAFTA in MMT Case, Ex-Negotiator says, INSIDE NAFTA, Nov. 29, 1995, at 3-4; Company May Press US for
NAFTA Challenge on CanadianFuel Bill, INSIDE NAFTA, Nov. 15, 1995, at 1,
18-19; CanadianMMT Bill Heads to Senate, Closer to Chapter 11 Complaint,
INSIDE NAFTA, Jan. 8, 1997, at 1.
148. See Shawn McCarthy, Threat of NAFTA Case Kills Canada's MMT
Ban, GLOBE & MAIL, July 20, 1998, at Al.
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to-state dispute settlement procedure (Chapter 20), which did
not proceed because the United States government elected not to
pursue the claim on Ethyl's behalf.149
1.

The Canadian ConstitutionalChallenge

Ethyl Canada brought a suit against the Attorney General
of Canada challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-29. The
case did not proceed to trial, but the parties filed the initial
pleadings with the Ontario Court (General Division) in June
1997.150

In its Statement of Claim, Ethyl argued that the regulation
was "ultravires the Parliament of Canada insofar as it is incon15 1
sistent with the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867."
Ethyl supported this position by arguing that the legislation's
subject matter was not the regulation of trade and commerce (a
matter of federal jurisdiction), since the legislation did not regu15 2
late trade as a whole but only the trade of a fuel additive.
The legislation could not be enacted to protect the natural environment or human health (partially federal jurisdiction), since
153
the scientific evidence did not meet the required threshold.
Thus there existed no rational connection between the government's stated objectives and the legislative means by which it
sought to achieve them.' 5 4 Rather, Ethyl argued that the subject matter of Bill C-29-the regulation of the production and
manufacture of fuels-fell within exclusive provincial jurisdiction. 155 In its defense, the federal government denied Ethyl's
claims and argued that the subject matter of the regulation was
"trade in or importation for a commercial purpose of controlled
substances." Thus the regulation fell within federal jurisdiction,
namely the regulation of "interprovincial trade in and the imporpurposes of certain manganese-based subtation for commercial
6
stances."15
149. See infra notes 262-72 and accompanying text.
150. See Statement of Claim, Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Attorney-Gen. of Canada
and the Minister of the Env't, Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) (No.
97-CV-126708) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Statement of Claim].
151. Id. at para. 1(a).
152. See id. at para. 28.
153. See id. at paras. 34-56.
154. See id. at paras. 44, 55.
155. See id. at paras 25-57.
156. Statement of Defence, Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Attorney-Gen. of Canada
and the Minister of the Env't, Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), para.
6 [hereinafter Statement of Defence].
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In a pre-trial motion seeking leave to intervene, Judge
Swinton granted the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers Association (CVMA) intervenor status, but denied the same to Pollution
Probe, an environmental NGO. 157 Instead, the Judge granted
Pollution Probe a more circumscribed "friend of the court" status, because it failed to show "a direct interest in and likelihood
that it can make a useful contribution to the proceedings."1 5 8 In
response to the federal government's own assertion that the purpose of the legislation was to regulate interprovincial and international trade rather than environmental protection, Judge
Swinton wrote:
Pollution Probe's desire to lead evidence of the impact of MMT on
human health and to cross-examine Ethyl about this issue suggests a
different and broader basis for supporting the legislation than that
which appears to lie behind its enactment. It is important to note that
we are dealing here with a distribution of powers case, which requires
the federal government to show that the purpose or effects of the legislation bring it within a federal head of jurisdiction. If the federal government does not believe that there is a general health risk underlying
the legislation because of manganese in the atmosphere, and does not
rest the legislation on this factual basis, there is no need for the evidence which Pollution Probe seeks to put forward. 15 9

It is significant that in this proceeding, the federal government categorized the environmental aspects as marginal and
"irrelevant to the issues raised in this action." 160 The federal
government thereby raised serious questions about its own legislative intent, given that the regulation was developed by the
Minister of the Environment and "sold" to the Canadian public
under the guise of environmental protection. 16 1 While this observation may not be relevant from a constitutional perspective,
it is an important indicator of protectionist regulation from an
international trade perspective.
2.

Canada'sAgreement on Internal Trade

In October 1997, following an unsuccessful consultation period with the Canadian government, the Alberta provincial government requested the establishment of a panel under Article
157. Reasons for Judgment, Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Attorney-Gen. of Canada
and the Minister of the Env't, Ontario Court of Justice (General Division).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Statement of Defence, supra note 156, at para. 6.
161. See supra notes 4 & 40 and accompanying text.
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1704 of the Canadian Agreement on Internal Trade (IT). 162
The provincial governments of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan intervened in support of Alberta. 16 3 The three provinces requested that "the panel recommend that Ottawa repeal
the ban and work with the provinces to determine whether the
additive does in fact pose an environmental or health risk." A
dispute resolution panel heard these arguments in April 1998
and rendered a decision in June, ruling in favor of the three
provinces. 164
The objectives of the AIT - much like the provisions in
NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT/WTO) 16 5- are, inter alia, to "reduce and eliminate ...
barriers to the free movement of persons, goods, services and investments within Canada" and "to establish an open, efficient
and stable domestic market." 16 6 As under NAFTA and GATT,
trade barriers may be established where it can be demonstrated
that such barriers achieve a legitimate objective based on sound
science and risk assessment without imposing an undue or disguised restriction on trade. 167 The three provinces challenged
the regulation on the basis that the legislation did not meet
162.

See Agreement on Internal Trade, REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 1704 PANEL

CONCERNING A DISPUTE BETWEEN ALBERTA AND CANADA REGARDING THE MANGANESE-BASED FUEL ADDITIVES ACT, June 12, 1998, File No. 97/98-15-MMT-

P058, (visited Oct. 9, 1998) <http://www.intrasec.mb.ca/eng/0798/mmt.pdf>
[hereinafter AIT Report]; Shawn McCarthy, Provinces Attack MMT Ban: Alberta Leads Charge in First Case Under Internal Trade Pact, GLOBE & MAIL,

Apr. 16, 1998., at B1.
163. See AIT Report, supra note 162, at 1.
164. The Panel was chaired by Clay Gilson, Professor Emeritus, University
of Manitoba. The other Panelists were: Bob Rae, Former Premier of Ontario;
Kathleen Kelly, Arbitration Lawyer; Claude Castonguay, Vice-Chairman of the
Board, Laurentian Bank; and Arthur Mauro, Former Chairman and CEO of the
Investors Group. See AIT Secretariat website (visited Oct. 9, 1998) <http://
www.intrasec.mb.ca>.
165. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 9 (1994) [hereinafter Final
Act].
166. Agreement on Internal Trade, July 1994, art. 100 (visited Oct. 9, 1998)
<http://www.intrasec.mb.ca/englitl.htm> [hereinafter AIT].
See Donald
Lenihan, When a Legitimate Objective Hits an Unnecessary Obstacle: Harmonizing Regulations and Standards in the Agreement on Internal Trade, in GETTING THERE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ON INTERNAL TRADE 26 (M.
Trevilcock & D. Schwanen, eds, 1995); Canadian Council of Ministers of the
Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MEASURES AND THE AGREEMENT ON
INTERNAL TRADE: A PRACTICAL MANUAL, (1995).
167. See AIT, supra note 166, arts. 210, 404 and Annex 405.1, 405.2; Chapters 7 and 9 of NAFTA; GATT Article XX and the GATT/WTO TBT and SPS
Agreement.
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these requirements and that "the cross-border ban is a blatant
example of Ottawa favoring the Ontario-based car makers over
1 68
the refineries.
1.

Provincial Perspectives

The provinces have a special interest in the issue because
they all have large refineries within their jurisdictions whose
16 9
economic interests had been adversely affected by the ban.
In its submission to the panel, Alberta cited the expected injury
to its refineries alone as $12 million in capital costs as well as
$11 million annually in operating costs. 170 About one-quarter of
the operational costs of the ban, which stem from the monitoring
necessary to enforce it, would also be borne by the Alberta refineries. 17 1 Additional costs would be imposed on those refineries
that wished to develop stockpiling facilities. 172 Further, Alberta
contended that the efficiency and convenience of current supply
17 3
arrangements would be disrupted.
Saskatchewan and Quebec had similar reasons for bringing
the case. 174 The Saskatchewan refinery had no suitable facilities for stockpiling MMT and therefore ran out of it shortly after
the legislation came into force. 17 5 The Saskatchewan refinery
had already undertaken the expense of adopting alternative additives and processes to boost its octane ratings at the time of
the hearing. 17 6 Thus Saskatchewan's search for industry relief
took on a somewhat different tone and status than that of
Alberta.
The provinces also argued that the federal government was
trespassing in an area of provincial jurisdiction and was ignoring the role of federal-provincial co-operation. 1 77 A provincial
government official stated:
168. McCarthy, supra note 162, at B1.
169. See Interview with Jim Ogilvie, Internal Trade Representative, Department of Intergovernmental & Aboriginal Affairs, Government of Alberta,
by telephone (June 5, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with
Jim Ogilvie].
170. See Government of Alberta Submission to AIT Panel. AIT REP. No. 97/
98-15-MMT-PO58, Appendix B (visited Oct. 9, 1998) <http://www.intrasec.mb.
ca.eng/0798/mmt.pdf> [hereinafter Submission to AIT].
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Interview with Jim Ogilvie, supra note 169.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Submission to AIT, supra note 170.
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A major (possibly primary in magnitude of implications) concern was
the overarching one of the appropriate role of the federal government
in issues that are in the area of joint federal-provincial or exclusively
provincial jurisdiction. There are mechanisms in place for joint decision-making, and the AIT supports this approach, but the federal government chose to act unilaterally. Into this feeds the issue of indirect
vs. direct legislation: the federal government could not justify what it
wanted to do (ban a substance) under environmental legislation, so
turned to trade legislation to accomplish the same end indirectly. The
irony is that the substance remains legal to manufacture, sell and use

between the territofor its intended purpose - it just can't be traded 178
ries of two jurisdictions within the same country.

In their submission to the Senate Standing Committee on
Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, the Alberta
government argued that the ban in MMT was not consistent
with "generally-accepted attributes that should characterize
sound regulatory legislation"1 79 for three reasons. First, where
there were issues of overlapping jurisdiction, federal-provincial
consultation should occur. 180 In particular, the two sides needed
to work cooperatively to ensure a more "consistent, streamlined
policy and regulatory framework" in the area of environmental
harmonization. 18 1 Here, the federal government acted unilaterally, without taking provincial objections into account. Second,
"regulations should serve a clear public purpose, effectively and
183
efficiently.' u8 2 The ban on MMT did not meet this standard.
Further, the regulatory policy of the Treasury Board Secretariat
that mandates public consultation was disregarded, a clear justification for federal intervention and respect for intergovernmental agreements. 8 4 Third, Alberta questioned the
appropriateness of the instrument. 8 5 The government stated
that "legislation should deal directly with the area it is intended
to control ... [and] in this case, a clumsy and inappropriate instrument ... has been used to achieve a purportedly environmental goal." 1 8 6 The legislature could accomplish its
178. Correspondence with Jim Ogilvie, Internal Trade Representative, Department of Intergovernmental & Aboriginal Affairs, Government of Alberta
(June 5, 1998) (on file with author).
179. Government of Alberta Submission to the Senate Standing Committee
on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, (visited Oct. 9, 1998)
<http://www.gov.ab.ca/iaa/html/billc29.html> [hereinafter Alberta Submission].
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
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environmental goals directly by placing an outright ban on the
1 7
substance, not just its movement. 3
2.

18 9
The AIT Decision18 8 : "A GATT's-Eye View"

Alberta argued that Bill C-29 was inconsistent with Articles
100, 401-405.1, 1505.8, and 1508.1 of the AIT. 9 0° Article 401
covers reciprocal non-discrimination and contains the GATT
principles of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment between the provinces. 19 1 As to the relationship between
the federal government and the provinces, Article 401 requires

the federal government to treat the goods of a province no less
favorably than the best treatment it accords to like, directly

competitive, or substitutable goods of other provinces. 19 2 In addressing this question, the panel considered whether the regulation favored one province or region over another. 19 3 The panel
found that the regulation applied evenly throughout Canada to
all provinces with refineries and that the regulation was consis-

tent with this provision.19 4 The panel did not go beyond the assessment that the regulation was non-discriminatory on its face
on a regional basis, ignoring that it was discriminatory in its
95
effect - a key motivator in the provinces bringing the dispute. 1
The panel could have found that the regulation had promoted
"industrial favoritism," as it favored Canada's primary auto-pro187.

See id.

188. See generally AIT Report, supra note 162.
189. This phrase is taken from Daniel A. Farber and Robert E. Hudec's
article, which considered the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause (which regulates
trade-restricting measures between U.S. states) from the perspective of parallel
provisions in the GATT. See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade
and the Regulatory State: A GAT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (1994).
190. The headings of the AIT articles mentioned are as follows: Article 100
(Objectives); Article 401 (Reciprocal Non-Discrimination); Article 402 (Right of
Entry and Exit); Article 403 (No Obstacles); Article 404 (Legitimate Objectives);
Article 405.1 (Reconciliation); Article 405.1 (Standards and Standards-Related
Measures); Article 1505.8 (Precautionary Principle); and Article 1508.1
(Harmonization).
191. See GATT supra note 167, at arts. III and I, respectively.
192. Article 401.1 reads: "Subject to Article 404, each Party shall accord to
goods of any other Party treatment no less favourable than the best treatment
it accords to: (a) its own like, directly competitive or substitutable goods; and
(b) like, directly competitive or substitutable goods of any other Party or nonParty." AIT, supra note 166, art. 401.
193. See AIT Report, supra note 162, at 6.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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ducing region (Ontario) over its primary oil-producing region
(Alberta), the key rivals in the dispute.
Article 402 of the AIT prohibits measures that restrict the
movement of goods, and Article 403 prohibits measures that create obstacles to internal trade. The panel found the measure to
be inconsistent with these provisions. 1 96 However, pursuant to
Article 404, and like Chapter 9 of NAFTA and Article XX of
GATT/WTO, such breaches can be "saved" where the purpose of
the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective, provided that
the measure does not "impair unduly" the access of goods to
meet that legitimate objective. 19 7 Contrasting the ban on MMT
with the gradual phase-out of lead, the panel found that
although there existed a legitimate objective in enacting the regulation, the federal government "had not demonstrated that
there existed a matter of such urgency or risk so widespread as
198
to warrant such comprehensive restrictions."
Article 404(c), qualified by 1505.7, requires the federal government to choose the least trade-restrictive means necessary to
meet its legitimate objective. Article 404(c) is a statutory codification of some of the earlier jurisprudence of GATT/WTO and
NAFTA that deals with restrictions on trade in pursuit of legitimate objectives. 199 The panel found that other equally effective
and reasonably available measures existed: tradeable permits,
20 0
taxation, and direct regulation under Article 46 of CEPA.
Since these other measures would not employ trade rules to
achieve other objectives, they were less trade-restrictive, even
though they might result in the elimination of MMT from the
Canadian marketplace.
Article 405 requires the provinces "to reconcile their standards and standards-related measures by harmonization, mutual recognition or by other means." This provision is similar to
196. See id. at 7.
197. Article 404 reads:
Where it is established that a measure is inconsistent with Article 401,
402 or 403, that measure is still permissible under this Agreement
where it can be demonstrated that:
(a) the purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective;
(b) the measure does not operate to impair unduly the access of persons, goods, services or investments of a Party that meet that legitimate objective;
(c) the measure is not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve
that legitimate objective ....

198. AIT Report, supra note 162, at 9.
199. See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 27.
200. See CEPA, supra note 5, at §§ 46-47. See AIT
at 10.

REPORT,

supra note 162,
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Article 906 of NAFTA and is consistent with the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade of GATT/ WTO. 20 1 Articles 1508
and 1509 encourage the provinces to harmonize environmental
measures under the auspices of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) and pursuant to the principles
set out by it. 2 ° 2 While Articles 1508 and 1509 do not mandate
consensus, they strongly encourage consultation and joint action
in the area of environmental standards. The panel found that
the federal government failed to work adequately in consulta20 3
tion with the provinces on this issue.
In summary, the panel found the regulation inconsistent
with the AIT, because it created an obstacle to trade (Articles
402 and 403) not justified by the legitimate objectives test (Article 404) and recommended that the government remove the inconsistency. 20 4 To some extent, this ruling called into question
the federal government's commitment to free trade.
This decision intensified the focus on the Chapter 11 investment dispute, which was of interest to the entire trade policy
and NGO community as it was the first test case of investorstate dispute settlement. Faced with this public relations problem and the fear that they could face a more expensive ($250
million) and embarrassing loss before the Chapter 11 panel, the
Canadian government settled the Chapter 11 dispute with Ethyl
20 5
before the panel process had been completed.
3.

NAFTA's Chapter 11

Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides rules for the resolution of
investor-state disputes through arbitral panels. 20 6 Companies
or individuals from a NAFTA country who are investors in another NAFTA country can initiate a claim against the government of the host country if they believe that their rights under
specific provisions of Chapter 11 of NAFTA have been
breached. 20 7 Chapter 11 does not provide an expansive list of
grounds on which an action may be brought, unlike the Chapter
20 state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism where the
201. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, [hereinafter TBT
Agreement] in GATT, supra note 24.
202. See supra Parts III and IV.
203. See AIT Report, supra note 162, at 7-8.
204. See id.
205. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
206. See NAFTA supra note 167, at ch. 11.
207. See Cheri D. Eklund, A Primer on the Arbitration of NAFTA Chapter
Eleven Investor-State Disputes, J. INT'L ARB. 141 (1992).
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breach of almost any provision is actionable. 20 8 Although a
number of cases have been initiated under Chapter 11, to date
no other cases have resulted in the establishment of a dispute
20 9
settlement panel.
In September 1996, Ethyl filed a $251-million claim against
the Canadian federal government on behalf of its investment in
Canada, namely Ethyl Canada Inc. 2 10 The Ethyl case went the
farthest in the Chapter 11 process of any case to date.2 1 1 A
panel was established in late 1997 under the United Nations
Commission for International Trade (UNCITRAL) arbitration
rules. 2 12 The deliberations and results of the panel process
"may be made public only with the consent of both parties."2 13
In July 1998, a settlement was reached outside the panel
process and the Canadian government agreed to repeal the ban
on MMT and pay Ethyl $19.3-million (Canadian) in costs and
lost profits. 21 4 The Canadian government announced that there
was no evidence that MMT was harmful to human health in low
amounts. 21 5 The government further stated that the auto industry failed to make the case that MMT damaged their on208. See NAFTA, supra note 167, at ch. 20.
209. There are however a number of pending claims. A Chapter 11 complaint was filed with the Mexican Government on October 13, 1997, by Metalclad Inc., a hazardous waste disposal company based in Newport Beach,
California. It claims that the state government of San Luis Potos prevented it
from establishing a hazardous waste landfill, and it is seeking $65 million for
breach of contract. Another similar case is expected to be filed on behalf of the
U.S. owned waste disposal company, Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan de C.V.
(DESONA). At a preliminary hearing on September 25, 1997, the owners of
DESONA, who are seeking $17 million in damages, stated that their property
was seized by armed agents of the government of the city of Naucalpan. See
Matthew Fleischer, International,AM. LAw. 92 (Dec. 1997).
210. See Court Ruling Limits Role of Third Partiesin Canada MMT Case,
AM. TRADE, Nov. 13, 1997, at 9.

211.
212.

See Ostry & Soloway, supra note 1, at A15.
See ARBITRATION RULES OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw (UNCITRAL), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
(Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNICITRAL ARBITRATION RULES]. The arbitral
panel for the case is comprised of three members: presiding over the case is
Karl Heinz Bocksteigel, a German professor; the U.S. member is Charles
Brower, an international arbitration lawyer located in Washington, D.C.; and
the Canadian member is Marc Lalonde, also an international arbitration lawyer and former bureaucrat. See Court Ruling Limits Role, supra note 210, at 9.
213. UNICITRAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 32(5). This may change, however, the considerable public pressure being imposed on the governments because of the lack of transparency. See Heather Scoffield, Trade Officials Put
NAFTA Secrecy Issues on Agenda, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 26, 1998, at B5.
214. See Shawn McCarthy, Failed Ban Becomes Selling Point for MMT,
GLOBE & MAIL, July 21, 1998, at A3.
215. See id.

1999]

ENVIRONMENTAL

TRADE BARRIERS UNDER NAFTA

85

board diagnostic systems. 2 16 This was a major victory for Ethyl,
which now plans to use the repealed 1ban
as a part of their world2 7
wide marketing strategy for MMT.

1.

The Chapter 11 Arguments

Prior to the passage of Bill C-29, the stakeholders to the dispute made submissions before the Senate Standing Committee. 218

This

is the only public

statement regarding

the

substantive arguments that would have been before the tribunal. 2 19 Ethyl claimed that Bill C-29 was inconsistent with three
provisions of NAFTA: "national treatment, performance requirements and NAFTA expropriation provisions. '2 20 National treatment requires non-discriminatory treatment between foreign
and domestic firms. 221 Bill C-29 did not explicitly prohibit the
sale of Canadian-made MMT, but prohibited its movement.
This, however, prevented the sale of foreign-made MMT in Canada. 2 22 Hypothetically, Ontario held that MMT could be legally

produced and sold within the province. However, as previously
noted, only one producer - Ethyl- held the patent and produced
MMT in North America. Ethyl argued that Bill C-29 violated
NAFTA's national treatment provisions, arguing that it "constitutes disguised discrimination aimed at Ethyl Canada and Ethyl
Corporation." 22 3 Ethyl likewise claimed national treatment provisions were further breached because there was no difference
between MMT produced in the provinces or the United States;
Bill C-29 could give "an unfair marketing and promotional advantage to investors based in Canada over non-Canadians selling the same product."2 2 4
Under NAFTA Chapter 11, governments are prohibited
from imposing performance requirements or imposing additional demands on a firm as a condition of investment in a
NAFTA country. 2 25 Ethyl contended that its subsidiary, Ethyl
Canada, was required to purchase Canadian-made MMT in or216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 28.
219. See Testimony of Barry Appleton, Ethyl's trade counsel (Feb. 19, 1997),
in STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 28 (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Testimony of Barry Appleton].
220. Id.
221. See NAFTA, supra note 167, at art. 1102.
222.

See Testimony of Barry Appleton, supra note 219.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See NAFTA, supra note 167, at art. 1106.
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der to remain in the MMT distribution business. 22 6 In this way,
Bill C-29 imposed performance requirements on Ethyl Canada. 2 27 It violated the NAFTA prohibition on performance re-

quirements by requiring the purchase of local goods. 2 28 In order
to retain its presence in the Canadian market, it would be required to purchase Canadian-made MMT. 2 29 As there is no Canadian manufacturer of MMT, Ethyl would have to build
manufacturing and blending plants in each province or territory
230
of Canada.
Finally, Ethyl argued that Bill C-29 was tantamount to expropriation under NAFTA, in that "ending Ethyl Canada's business is the same as expropriating it, and the NAFTA requires
companies to be compensated for their expropriated investments." 2 3 1 Specifically, Ethyl alleged a loss in value of its manuin future sales, and damage to its
facturing plant, a decline
232
corporate reputation.
Arguments were also presented at the Standing Senate
Committee on behalf of the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers
Association. 23 3 CVMA argued that Bill C-29 was not contrary to
NAFTA, as Canada had the sovereign right to pursue the necessary type and degree of environmental protection, including a
precautionary stance on MMT. 23 4 CVMA further contended

that concern about the national treatment issue was unfounded
for two reasons. 2 35 First, "Bill C-29 would not have the effect of
discriminating in favor of domestic production because there is
no domestic production of MMT," and second, the "national
treatment rule does not extend to situations where a separate
domestic industry such as ethanol might be incidentally benefited."23 6 It was further argued that an adverse impact of a bona
226.

See Testimony Barry Appleton, supra note 219.

227.
228.

See id.
See NAFTA, supra note 167, at art. 1106.

229.

See Testimony of Barry Appleton, supra note 219.

230. See id.
231. Id.
232. See Michelle Sforza & Mark Valliantos, The Case with Ethyl - MAI
Coming Attractions, IN PREAMBLE CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY BRIEFING PAPER
(1997) (on file with author).
233. See Presentation by Ivan Feltham, Q.C. (Feb. 19, 1997), in STANDING
COMMITrEE, supra note 28 (on file with author) [hereinafter Presentation of
Ivan Feltham].
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Id.
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fide regulation does not constitute expropriation under Chapter
11.237

238
2. Regulatory Takings

The expropriation claim has become particularly contentious. Under NAFTA, the "applicable rules of international law"
govern the question of when a regulation becomes compensable
for a foreign investor. 23 9 It is important to note that every regulation can alter the relative costs and opportunities of firms,
whether domestic or foreign. 240 The Canadian government previously faced the threat of a similar action when United States
tobacco companies threatened to challenge a proposed Canadian
regulation mandating plain packaging on cigarettes under
NAFTA's expropriation provisions. 24 1 The Canadian govern2 42
ment later abandoned the regulation.
Under international law, the majority of cases deal with direct expropriation rather than expropriation through regulatory
measures. 24 3 Evaluating whether this regulation is indeed tantamount to expropriation lies in international takings jurisprudence, to some degree informed by American constitutional
law. 2 44 On this issue, international law jurisprudence provides
little guidance, as "there does not ...

appear to be any univer-

sally agreed set of principles as to when one government action
should fall into one category and another in the other." 245 Commentators warn that regulations construed as expropriation
"could make regulatory reform extremely costly, but is an interpretation of the meaning of expropriation quite common in the
237. See id.
238. The following section draws heavily on Ostry & Soloway, supra note 1,
at A15.
239. See NAFTA, supra note 167, at art. 1131.
240. See David Vogel & Alan M. Rugman, Environmentally Related Trade
Disputes Between the United States and Canada, 27 AM. REV. OF CAN. STUD.,
271, 271 (1997).
241. See David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 523-25 (1996).
242. See id.
243.

See JON R. JOHNSON, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A

COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 289-90 (1994).
244. See id.; Edward M. Graham, Regulatory Takings, Supernational Treatment and the MultilateralAgreement on Investment: Issues Raised By Nongovernmental Organizations, CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1998). See also
Schneiderman, supra note 241, at 12.
245. Evan Atwood & Michael J. Trebilcock, Public Accountability in an Age
of ContractingOut, 27 CAN. Bus. L.J., at 45 (1996).
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U.S. domestic takings jurisprudence. ' 24 6 In the United States,
property rights are constitutionally entrenched, and a significant body of case law discusses the obligations of the government to compensate those adversely affected by its
regulations. 2 47 In Canada, however, property rights are not
constitutionally entrenched,
and the extent of judicial control is
8
far less comprehensive.

24

The challenge on the grounds that Bill C-29 was tantamount to expropriation has become a significant source of controversy. 2 49 Environmental and consumer groups view the
Ethyl case as a dangerous precedent that could seriously erode
the freedom of a country to pass any domestic legislation affecting the property interests of a foreign firm. 250 There is concern

now that any environmental regulation will become potentially
subject to scrutiny, raising important questions about
sovereignty. 2 5 1 One commentator even suggested that amend25 2
ments to NAFTA may be necessary to correct this problem.
This is ironic when one considers the history of Chapter 11. As
The Economist noted, "NAFTA's wide-ranging protection for investors was aimed mainly at Mexico, whose legal system Canadian and American negotiators did not trust."25 3 Apparently, no
one imagined that the text might be wielded by crafty American
2 54
firms in Canada.
The Chapter 11 challenge launched a very public grassroots
campaign on the part of ENGOs that adversely affected negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the issue of regulatory
takings in an international context. 2 55 Those who are "suspi246.

Robert Howse & Jonathan Feldman, A Brief Analysis of the MAI, 6

CAN. WATCH, Mar. 1998, at 33; see Graham, supra note 244.
247. See Richard Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 19-31 (1985); Graham, supra note 244.

248. See JOHNSON, supra note 243, at 290.
249. See NAFTA- The Sting in Trade's Tail, ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 70
[hereinafter ECONOMIST].

250. See Friends of the Earth, CanadaWithdraws Environmental Law After
NAFTA Challenge (electronic press release July 20, 1998) <http://www.igc.org>.
251. See McCarthy, Threat of NAFTA Case Kills Canada'sMMT Ban, supra
note 14, at Al.
252. See Sylvia Ostry, Looking Back to Look Forward: The Multilateral
Trading System After 50 Years (1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
253. ECONOMIST, supra note 249, at 70.
254. See id.
255. See Madelaine Drohan, Nations Set to Bury MAI,GLOBE & MAIL,Apr.
27, 1998, at B1.
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cious of big business" view the outcome of this dispute as a carte
blanche for firms to challenge any environmental regulation on
the grounds that firm assets are being expropriated; the same
skeptics seek to have comparable provisions taken out of the
MAI as it currently stands. 25 6 Ethyl resisted this allegation,
stating that the Ethyl case is irrelevant to the debate about the
MAI, and that they are "entirely separate issues. '25 7 Jim Hanes
of Ethyl Canada wrote:
C-29 is not an environmental law; it is trade legislation. And it was
developed as a trade law by a government bowing to pressure from the
automobile companies. From both an environmental and health perspective, there is nothing wrong with MMT. Health Canada's rigorous
review of MMT reconfirmed
earlier conclusions that MMT poses no
258
risk to human health.

In any event, the retreat of the Canadian government on
this issue has the potential to be the hill on which the MAI may
die. The precise definition of expropriation was a major issue in
the OECD negotiations of the MAI, drafts of which largely
adopted the NAFTA language. Graham contended that such investor protection provisions may be bad policy. 2 59 Concerned

about a situation where foreign investors are placed in a better
position than the nationals of a given country, he wrote:
The effect of the MAI, if the investor protection provisions are interpreted to cover regulatory takings, is to put international investors in a
privileged category among all nations. They alone would be in a position to press claims under rules highly favorable to them for compensation for regulatory taking, irrespective of circumstances under which
260
the regulatory actions were to have been taken.

Any investment agreement negotiated in the World Trade
Organization will have to include some form of investor protection. 2 6 1 Thus the institutional challenge is to design an agreement that protects foreign investors while at the same time
allowing sufficient scope for governments to function. Had the
MMT case proceeded, it could have provided a much needed
26 2
"test-case" and guidance in shaping new global rules.

256.
257.

See ECONOMIST, supra note 249, at 70.
Letter to the Editor from Jim Hanes, Ethyl Canada, GLOBE & MAIL,

May 29, 1998, at A18.
258. Id.
259. Graham, supra note 244.
260. Id.
261. See Ostry & Soloway, supra note 1, at A15.
262. There are other cases now pending involving U.S. firms in Mexico.
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3. Chapter 20
Chapter 20 of NAFTA provides a mechanism for state-tostate dispute settlement. 263 It can be used for "any actual or
proposed measure or any other matter that it considers might
affect the operation of NAFTA." 2 64 There is currently no Chapter 20 claim in progress, but in order for a Chapter 20 case to be
initiated, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) would
have to take up Ethyl's case against the Canadian Government.
Given the position of the Environmental Protection Agency on
MMT, it is unlikely that the Clinton administration will take up
this issue.265 Although a Chapter 20 panel was never established, Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and Interna26 6
tional Trade argued that Bill C-29 is contrary to NAFTA.
Concerned about the number of trade irritants between Canada
and the United States, the Canadian Minister of International
Trade wrote a letter to then Environment Minister Sergio
Marchi stating, "Let me stress my department's belief that Bill
[C-29] should not be reintroduced as it could have many adverse
implications for Canadian trade, without compensating environ'2 6 7
mental benefits.
In its effort to convince the U.S. government to take up its
claim, Ethyl argued that Bill C-29 violated NAFTA in two
ways. 268

First, the ban on MMT violated NAFTA's national

treatment provisions, for the same reasons as outlined in the
Chapter 11 claim. 2 69 Second, although NAFTA recognizes the

freedom of parties to adopt measures relating to the protection
of the environment, such measures cannot constitute an unnecessary obstacle to trade unless "the demonstrable purpose of the
263. See John Kirton & Julie Soloway, Assessing NAFTA's Environmental
Effects: Dimensions of a Framework and the NAFTA Regime, in 1 NAFTA EFFECTS WORKING PAPER SERIES (1996).
264. NAFTA, supra note 167, at art. 2006(1).
265. See Interview with Alan Alexandroff, Special Counsel to Ethyl Corp., at
Toronto, Ontario (July 9, 1997) (on file with author).
266. See Peter Morton & Alan Toulin, Eggleton Picks Trade Battles, FIN.
POST, Mar. 6, 1996, at 4 (quoting a letter from Minister of International Trade
Art Eggleton to Environment Minister Sergio Marchi).
267. Id.
268. Ethyl relied on an analysis done by Gordon Ritchie, Former Deputy
Chief Negotiator for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and current Chief
Executive Officer of Strategico, Inc., a public policy consulting firm. See U.S.
May Challenge Canada via NAFTA in MMT Case, supra note 147, at 3-4.
269. Gordon Ritchie wrote, "[w]e would argue that an outright prohibition
against the importation of U.S. produced MMT, while allowing the continued
production and sale of MMT within Canada, amounts to a violation of the national treatment obligation." Id.
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measure is to achieve a legitimate objective." 2 70 The hypothetical purpose of the legislation was to remove MMT from the Canadian market. 27 1 The legislation failed to meet this objective,
27 2
since MMT could still be produced and sold within Canada.
Therefore the argument was put forth "that the demonstrable
inability of the measure to achieve the desired objective means
that there is no 'demonstrable purpose' and should not be saved
by this exemption. '2 73 Had this case proceeded to a Chapter 20
panel, the result would not have been so clear. The panel would
have had to grapple with the complex issue of whether the removal of MMT was indeed a legitimate objective.
VI.

TRADE POLICY ISSUES

As stated previously, a welfare analysis may indicate government protection where intent is difficult to discern.2 7 4 Welfare analysis requires measuring both the increase to domestic
welfare and the loss to global welfare of the trade restriction.
Measuring the exact benefits of an environmental regulation
has obvious difficulties. Most often, the question will be asked
in terms of its legitimacy: to what extent is the regulation based
on sound scientific principles?
One of the major trade policy issues that arises from the C29 dispute concerns the interaction between scientific principles
and trade policy. To what extent must a country justify its regulation on sound science? Who decides what constitutes sound
science? To what extent may a country employ the precautionary principle as a basis by which to regulate?
The widely divergent claims regarding the effects of MMT
make it difficult to assess the degree to which it poses a risk to
environmental and human health. Even within the federal government, there is no consensus on the effects of MMT. 275 The

regulation was purportedly drafted because of the alleged negative effects on autos and as a precaution against deleterious effects on human health. Where there is no agreement on the
supporting science, there can only be controversy in enacting
trade-restricting environmental regulations. This highlights the
difficulty facing trade policy today: in a world of limited scien270.
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tific knowledge, how can we make good policy decisions? Scientific data has the initial appeal of being completely objective,
while scientific inquiry is actually riddled with value judgments.
Scientific risk assessments are by nature uncertain, and even
to conduct a risk assessment requires
the choice of methodology
2 76
a normative judgment.
The requirement that sound science be the minimum standard for regulation poses potential problems in interpretation
and application. It seems to imply a "rigorous cause-and-effect
nexus between the empirical scientific evidence and the national
regulatory measure chosen." 2 77 The existing standard assumes
that there exists one objective and correct view of any scientific
issue. Science is not a static entity, but an evolving dialogue
within various international communities. As one commentator
noted, "[i]t is by no means obvious... that 'good science' can be
defined with precision in the abstract."2 78 Furthermore, the policy rationale behind many public health measures is precautionary: where there is a small but serious risk, regulators will err
on the side of caution. 27 9 For example, in the United States and
Canada, lead was removed from gasoline before the harmful effects were substantiated by scientific evidence. More recently,
there has been strong controversy over BSE disease in cattle
and the extent to which measures can be based on tentative scientific evidence. 28 0 In reference to this issue, The Economist recently noted that "[riesponding to a previously unknown disease
brings a dilemma. Over-reaction risks diverting scarce resources from real and soluble problems. Under-reaction risks an
epidemic." 2 8 ' The question essentially becomes a value judgment of whether the situation merits precautionary measures.
There is clearly some health risk associated with MMT as a
substance. But recall that the auto manufacturers substantiated their health claims on the fact that MMT caused exhaust
systems to malfunction, leading to increased air pollution. They
did not base their argument on the direct toxic effects of MMT.
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277. Wirth, supra note 276, at 826.
278. Id. at 827.
279. See RICHARD BLACKHURST ET AL., TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES (1994), available at (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://iisd.ca/
trade/pubs.htm>.
280. See Coping with BSE, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 15.
281. Id.

1999]

ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE BARRIERS UNDER NAFTA

93

The federal government has similarly justified its actions under
its power to regulate trade, not its capacity to protect human
health. This point is significant because the precautionary principle would operate only to exclude the use of a potentially
harmful toxin. Reliance on the precautionary principle would be
a more difficult case to make where a general reduction in air
pollution was sought, one of the objectives of the federal
government.
Not knowing the risks of MMT makes it extremely difficult
to evaluate the environmental efficacy of the measure. It is not
at all clear that ethanol is the superior additive from an environmental standpoint. Although ethanol emissions are arguably
less polluting, a more accurate test of environmental effectiveness would entail a life-cycle analysis which assesses environmental impact from start to finish. David Vogel observes that
there are no perfectly clean burning fuels; all engines that burn
fuels produce by-products that harm the environment, and
United States data do not clearly support ethanol as a cleanburning fuel. 28 2 The environmental case for ethanol is further
eroded when the environmental effects of its production are considered. 28 3 Corn is an energy-intensive crop to grow and transform into alcohol. 28 4 Vogel notes that the production of ethanol
may actually consume more energy than it generates, making it
an energy-inefficient choice. 28 5 Ethanol also contains less energy than gasoline, so automobiles require more of it to produce
286
the same output.
The benefits of the regulation need to be balanced against
the costs. How expensive will the ban actually be? There will be
costs to the refineries for capital change and the ongoing expenses associated with the ban. This will ultimately result in
increased costs to the consumer. The consumer will also pay for
the more expensive MMT substitutes. What effect will this have
on the majority of the population that relies on autos for transportation? What effect will this have on the transportation industry and all of the industries that rely on it?
A more troubling concern arises from the subsidy and protection given to the ethanol industry. Many economists view
subsidies and protection as business environments where firm
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inefficiencies flourish. 28 7 Such policies allow a relatively small
number of well-organized and well-financed individuals that
represent specific industry interests to gain at the expense of the
broader consumer welfare. What cost does this represent to the
Canadian taxpayer? Could this be a farm welfare program in
disguise? To what extent have competitive distortions been introduced into the agricultural marketplace and its secondary
markets such as feedgrains for livestock? Concerns are also
raised about those industries displaced by a growing corn industry, such as soybeans. Vogel makes the case that, in the United
States, subsidies to the ethanol industry have had a net welfarereducing impact. 28 8 Questions are raised about whether trade
restrictions are an efficient means to subsidize farmers. Yet
automakers claim that they cannot meet environmental standards set by the federal government without this ban and will
not be able to make warranty claims. Perhaps a broader conception of environmental friendliness should be undertaken beyond
strictly air quality to maximize domestic social welfare
objectives.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The fuel additives issue has become a Byzantine structure
of business interests, environmental coalitions, and political maneuvering. In this case, a complex "Baptist-Bootlegger" coalition
has been created. The environmental and consumer advocacy
groups are working in what they perceive to be the public interest, believing that MMT is harmful to the environment and
human health. They are joined by two bootleggers: the ethanol
producers and the auto manufacturers. The ethanol producers
are the more obvious bootleggers, having undertaken lobbying
efforts to have MMT banned. They are heavily subsidized
by the Canadian government and have a wealth-maximization
agenda. 2 89 The ethanol producers, however, are minuscule compared to the size and power of the auto manufacturers, who
stand to gain or lose a great deal depending on the fate of MMT.
Yet it may be unfair to cast the auto industry as a bootlegger,
since it is responding to the increasingly strict demands on the
part of consumers and government to develop cleaner technologies. In this way, the auto manufacturers are only partially
287. See generally RUGMAN & VERBEKE, supra note 110 (discussing the relationship between trade policy and corporate strategies).
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cloaking themselves in the public interest agenda ascribed to
them. The more subtle point is that the auto manufacturers are
attempting to shift the burden of cleaner technologies to the oil
producers through this regulation.
The existence of a Baptist-Bootlegger coalition offers only a
prima facie indication of whether an environmental regulation
is being used for protectionist ends. Here, a coalition exists between environmental and consumer groups and the two industries that actively lobbied for the passage of this regulation. The
fact that the Canadian government settled the Chapter 11 dispute with Ethyl before the case was heard may indicate that the
regulation was more about industrial policy than environmental
policy. But given the range of explanations offered by the Canadian government, the intent behind the regulation is not readily
discernible.
Beyond the intent of the government, it is helpful to perform
a welfare analysis of the impugned regulation, asking if the cost
in terms of losses to global welfare significantly outweighed the
benefits. The scientific community is divided as to the health
effects of MMT, and there are alternative measures that are less
trade-restrictive. There is also a strong indication that the ban
on MMT had an overall negative impact on consumer welfare.
Given the evidence presented, it appears that this regulation
was more about the pursuit of a North American-wide fuel standard than environmental and human health effects.

